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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between a CEO’s social network, firm identity, 
and firm performance. There are two competing theories that predict contradictory 
outcomes. Following social network theory, one would expect a positive relation between 
social networks and firm performance, while agency theory in general and Bebchuk’s 
managerial power approach in particular predicts a negative relationship between social 
networks and firm performance. Based on a new and comprehensive measure of CEOs 
social networks, we observe for 363 non-financial firms in the UK that the size of a 
CEO’s social network affects firm performance negatively. Even so, growth companies 
are actively seeking CEOs with a large social network, which is in line with the social 
network theory. Still, we find evidence in support of the argument that well-connected 
CEOs use the power they obtain through their social network to the detriment of 
shareholders. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Popular prejudice sometimes suggests that CEOs land their jobs through 
connections made on the golf course rather than through outstanding performance on the 
job; hence that it is more important who you know than what you know. Such a biased 
selection process would run counter the best practice of board nomination committees 
and violate the spirit of the various corporate governance reforms around the world. It 
would ultimately damage the performance of the firm. We aim to establish empirically 
whether this popular belief can be disregarded as a popular myth, or if it is indeed a fair 
reflection of reality. In particular, we want to understand under which circumstances 
boards find it important for CEOs to have access to social networks, and whether the 
board structure has any influence on the social network characteristics of the CEOs they 
choose. Ultimately, we are interested to know whether well-connected CEOs are a benefit 
or a cost to the companies they manage. An answer to this question is of much wider 
policy relevance, as any underperformance will point towards a corporate governance 
failure in either the selection or subsequent monitoring process of the CEO, or both. 
Our empirical analysis is based on two competing theories – the social network 
theory and Bebchuk’s agency theory based managerial power approach – that predict 
contradictory results for the relation between social network and performance. With this 
paper, we aim to shed light on and validate either of the two theories on the prevailing 
impact of a CEO’s social network on the firm. In effect, we follow the recommendation 
of Karl Popper (1959, p. 108), and “choose the theory which best holds its own in 
competition with other theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves itself the 
fittest to survive”. Following social network theory, one would predict a positive relation 
between social networks and firm performance, since the networks improve the flow of 
information and the exchange of know-how, thus reducing information asymmetries 
among managers. In contrast, agency theory predicts a negative relationship between 
social networks and firm performance, as social connections lead to lower monitoring 
and more freedoms for the manager, which she uses to her advantage, and the detriment 
of shareholders’ wealth. 
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 It is paramount to the success of any firm that boards select the best person to be 
CEO. This requires an unbiased selection process, where the board chooses – amongst 
other things – the optimal level of social network exposure of a CEO. It is important that 
a board does not allow itself to cloud its choice for a new CEO by social influence 
activity from board members or others outside the firm. In fact, corporate governance 
rules and criteria establish institutions and standards that should lead to an unbiased 
selection process of the CEO, as well as other executive and non-executive board 
members.  
With this empirical paper - based on data from 363 UK based non-financial firms 
and a comprehensive measure of social networks of CEO’s - we aim to turn fiction about 
the role of social networks into facts about its importance in the selection process, as well 
as its ultimate impact on firm performance. Hence, in this paper we ask ourselves two 
distinctly different research questions. In the first, we aim to understand the determinants 
of CEO selection, hence what are the properties boards look for in a new CEO. Second, 
once they have been appointed, we want to understand how the access to social networks 
affects the performance of the firm. 
We find that a CEO’s large social network has a negative impact on firm 
performance. We also show that innovative high-growth companies actively choose well-
connected people as CEOs, likely in anticipation that her social networks provide support 
in the innovation process. In contrast, highly leveraged firms choose CEOs with a small 
social network, possibly because boards believe that socially unconnected leaders might 
be better in managing these firms under pressure. In conclusion, we find evidence in 
support of Bebchuk’s managerial power approach and argue that managers use their 
social network to the detriment of shareholders. 
This paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the literature on social 
networks, while Section 3 outlines the two competing theories on social networks and 
develops the corresponding hypotheses on how it should affect the firm. Section 4 
describes the data and methodology, and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 
concludes. 
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2. Literature 
 
 
Research into the social network effect on boards goes back more than 20 years, 
focusing initially on board interlocks, which centered on analyzing the phenomenon that 
CEOs sit on each other boards’ and so form a small social network. According to one 
point of view, these interlocks are beneficial as they allow the diffusion of innovations 
through which a variety of policies and practices are spread across firms (e.g., Davis, 
1991; Mizruchi, 1992; Palmer, Jennings and Zhou, 1993; Westphal and Zajac, 1997). In 
contrast, there is the reciprocity of favors argument asserting that CEOs protect each 
other on their respective boards, are only accountable to themselves, and so tend to be 
protected from the disciplining forces of the market (Useem, 1984). Westphal and Zajac 
(1996) argue that these interlocks lead to self-selection of board members, with the 
equilibrium outcomes of powerful CEOs selecting passive outside directors, or powerful 
boards selecting a CEO with a reputation for actively monitoring management. However, 
interlock research has its clear limitations, with one of the main concerns being that “its 
primary focus [is] on the effect of direct ties or relational embeddedness on firm behavior 
to the exclusion of more distant network ties or structural embeddedness” (Gulati and 
Westphal, 1999, p. 473). 
Recently, another strand of the literature emerged that focused on establishing 
whether social networks exist on corporate boards. For example, Davis et al. (2003) study 
the structure of the corporate elite network in the US during the 1980s and 1990s. They 
concentrate on the degree of clustering, the length of the paths connecting any given 
directors, as well as the stability of the observed network.1 They find a remarkable 
stability of the network over the years they study, despite considerable changes in both 
the role of the commercial banks and corporate governance rules affecting boardrooms. 
The elimination of important market ‘players’ - such as bankers - from the network has 
not altered the general characteristic of the network. They also observe a high degree of 
                                                 
1 Path-length is measured as the number of directors (boards) required to create a link between two 
directors (firms). Clustering is ‘the proportion of possible ties among actors that are realized’ (Davis et al. 
2003, p. 316), and network stability is seen as the degree of change to path-length and clustering over the 
years. 
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clustering and short average path-lengths (both indications of a small world phenomenon 
on boards; see below for more details). They conclude that networks appear to be 
universal, and affect the whole cross-section of US companies. 
Robins and Alexander (2004) use ‘affiliation’ networks, i.e. networks 
distinguishing between individuals and boards as different types of social entities, to 
establish whether a small world effect exists on boards. This is the case once they can 
observe clusters of board members that are well connected amongst each other, but also 
have good links to other groups. Based on data from Australia and the USA for 1996, 
they establish that the small world effect “is shaped more by decisions by some (not all) 
company boards to appoint moderate to high numbers of interlockers as directors, rather 
than by certain interlockers seeking to be on unusually large numbers of boards” (p. 84). 
In other words, they find different outcomes for the company-to-company and director-
to-director networks, with more evidence of small world characteristics in the former 
than the latter. These results are in line with an extensive body of research on the small 
world effect, that in summary confirms the existence of social networks on corporate 
boards (for a good overview of the literature on the small world effect see Uzzi et al. 
(2007)).  
Conyon and Muldoon (2006a) examine large samples of both boards and directors 
for the USA, UK and Germany. They use a similar approach to Newman et al. (2001) to 
derive theoretically expected values, which they then compare to their small world 
statistics without having to generate random graphs. They conclude that even though the 
small world phenomenon exists between boards of directors, they cannot find evidence 
for “clubby” behaviour in the boardroom. In other words, there is no more systematic 
structure, no stronger tendency towards ‘smallness’ than one should expect to find by 
chance (p. 21). In a companion paper, Conyon and Muldoon (2006b) establish that ‘busy’ 
outside directors sit on boards with other outside directors, but find no statistically 
significant indication of exclusive networks amongst CEOs.  
Bebchuk et al. (2007) argue that CEO centrality, hence the relative importance of 
the CEO vs. the management team, has a negative impact on firm performance. This 
means, the more power and importance the CEO holds within the top management team, 
the less the firm ranks on a number of performance indicators. 
 6
We aim to fill a gap in the literature by putting the CEO, and not the board, at the 
centre stage of our analysis. We expand the literature by establishing whether certain 
board and firm characteristics influence the choice of CEO in terms of her social network 
structure, and ask ourselves if a CEO’s social network does create value for the firm, or 
not. In addition, by relying on a novel and more holistic measure of social network, we 
can measure the impact of social network much more precisely than previous studies. 
 
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
Determinants of CEO Selection  
How do social networks influence the work of executive and outside directors? 
Sociology based social network theory argues that workers frequently locate jobs through 
friends and relatives rather than through the open job market (Granovetter, 1973, 1974). 
Subsequent research developed the idea that so called weak ties are relatively more 
important in relaying valuable and suitable job offers more frequently than strong ties, 
and that a matching process through weak ties is superior to an open market process 
(Granovetter, 1983 and Montgomery, 1992). Strong social ties are those ones with family 
and close friends, and indicative of a group of very similar personalities and background 
(e.g. same jobs, neighborhoods, alumni connections). As a result, a group of people 
connected by strong social ties will have access to similar information, with each new 
member only making a marginal contribution to the group’s information base. In contrast, 
people with whom only weak social links exist might be able to provide new information, 
which is of much higher value to the group (Strahilevitz, 2004). 
As a result, weak ties are playing an important role in transmitting information 
through organizations in particular, and society in general. This exposes the weakness of 
measuring social integration through board interlocks, as board interlocks primarily 
represent current strong ties. It ignores weak ties, as well as ties formed through previous 
interactions - some of which might date back many years. This means that by measuring 
board interlocks, the information exchange and innovation capacity of social networks 
might be widely underestimated. A holistic measure of social network exposure of a 
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CEO, like the one used in this paper, is therefore necessary to estimate the information 
exchange through weak links. 
Organizations typically innovate – with the aim of creating new products based on 
re-configured existing technologies, or newly developed technologies – by increasing 
both their depth and breadth of the knowledge base and deploying it in new directions 
(Tushman and Anderson, 2004). Having exposure through weak links to a diverse set of 
people with different backgrounds and technical expertise increases the knowledge base, 
and thus provides a fertile ground for product and process innovations. It also offers the 
necessary support for the managerial challenge to reconfigure the firm so that it can 
exploit the fruits of its innovation. It is therefore important that a CEO of an innovative 
company, which are typically also high-growth firms, has access to a large number of 
weak ties. This should provide her with the diverse information necessary to foster and 
accelerate the innovation process and quality within the firm. In conclusion, we anticipate 
that boards of innovative high-growth companies are actively searching for and hiring 
CEOs with access to a large social network. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1:  High-growth firms hire well-connected CEO’s. 
 
The corporate finance literature generally assumes that higher level of debt can 
act as a disciplining devise for managers, as it increases the likelihood of bankruptcies, 
which are particularly costly for managers (Tirole, 2006). High levels of debt are 
normally a sign of firms under stress, but are also actively used by Private Equity houses 
and other active investors as a form of corporate governance devise. In both cases, these 
highly leveraged firms normally aim to restructure their operation, close loss-making 
lines of business, and (re-)focus on profitable parts of the operation. There is normally 
little need for risky innovation during such restructuring periods, but instead for focused 
and diligent execution of the restructuring plan. We therefore predict that boards choose a 
CEO that has these capabilities and so hypothesize that: 
 
H2:  Firms under stress (high leverage) will hire focused CEO’s with only a 
small social network. 
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 CEO Connectedness and Firm Performance 
As we have outlined above, access to social network allows for a quick transfer of 
expertise and best practices between connected people and companies, which in turn 
enables it to exploit new opportunities (Geletkanycz et al., 2001). Exploiting new 
opportunities will give the CEO the chance to grow the company by either developing 
new products through product innovation, or gaining a competitive advantage in 
producing existing products through process innovation. This improved innovation 
process will lead to new opportunities for the firm, and a subsequent growth of the firm’s 
turnover. In addition, a CEO’s social network can help to ‘open doors’ and push sales. 
There is indicating in the prior literature that the directors’, albeit not the CEO’s, social 
network has an impact on the sales of companies that deliver to the public sector. For 
example, Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) illustrate how politically connected directors can 
help their companies attract government contracts. Based on the assumption that the CEO 
promotes her company’s interests, we predict that: 
 
H3: The size of a CEO social network has a positive influence on sales growth 
 
A well-documented argument, which stems from agency theory, points towards a 
negative relationship between social networking on board level and firm performance. 
This argument is based on the premise that directors exploit the inherent information 
asymmetry to pursue their own wealth maximization objectives to the detriment of 
shareholders’ wealth. Over the years, a significant literature has developed that addresses 
the impact of a board’s social network on the firm’s corporate governance practices. 
Hallock (1997), for example, finds that the pay of US CEOs who sit in interlocked boards 
is on average higher than the pay of CEOs who are not in interlocked boards. He also 
reports high levels of interlocking for his sample of large US firms; the interlocked firms 
range from 8% to 20% of the total sample depending on the definition of interlocks. Fich 
and White (2003), again on US data, find that interlocking between boards tends to 
increase CEO compensation and decrease CEO turnover. They interpret their results as a 
consequence of entrenchment. They, however, fail to establish a significant relation 
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between directors’ interlocking and firm performance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006), using 
a different measure of networking, namely the number of directorships held by outside 
directors, find that ‘busy boards’ are associated with weak corporate governance and low 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. In particular, they report insignificant 
differences in the CEO turnover sensitivity between busy and insider dominated boards. 
They also present a negative and significant relationship between firm accounting 
performance and the existence of busy outside directors. Barnea and Guedj (2006) find a 
strong positive relation between connected boards and CEO compensation, even after 
controlling for observed and unobserved firm and CEO characteristics (i.e. geographic 
location of the firm; interlocked, busy and entrenched boards; different governance 
measures, etc). It is important to point out, though, that the literature has not established a 
clear relationship between directors’ interlocking and CEO total compensation (see for 
example Core et al., 1999). In addition, the literature has failed to establish a clear 
relationship between outside director independence as an indicator of governance and 
firm performance (for a review on this topic see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). 
Kramarz and Thesmar (2006) analyzing the issue of social networks for a French 
sample observe that social networks affect both the board composition and corporate 
governance policies. In particular, they find that companies with a well-connected former 
civil servant as CEO have worse accounting performance and are more likely to employ 
other ex-government employees on their boards. These companies also have lower 
sensitivity between CEO turnover and performance. In addition, the CEOs who came 
from the civil service are more likely to hold outside positions in other firms, which leads 
to the likelihood of holding multiple board seats (in 42% of all cases vs. 12% for non-
civil servants). In support, Nguyen-Dang (2005) documents that once the CEO and other 
board members share the same social circle, underperforming CEOs are less likely to be 
fired. If nevertheless these CEOs are ousted from their position, they are then more likely 
to find a good position afterwards. However, there is both empirical and theoretical 
evidence that points towards this being a general problem across boards, and not an 
isolated French phenomenon. McDonald and Westphal (2003, p. 7) have pointed out that 
“network ties to individuals who are similar on salient demographic characteristics, 
including functional background, are more likely to facilitate the exchange of social 
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support”. Westphal and Milton (2000, p. 373) argue that those social network ties that 
were formed across different boards will lead to “particularly high levels of social 
cohesion”, and so to strong group identity that provides social support and protection, 
which allows CEOs to exploit their position to the detriment of shareholders. Following 
this strand of literature, we predict that: 
 
H4: The size of a CEO’s social network has a negative impact on firm 
performance 
 
 
4. Method  
 
Sample and Data 
Based on a comprehensive sample of UK FTSE-250 and FTSE-Small Cap 
companies in 2005, we collected our social network, corporate governance and 
ownership information from BoardEx database. BoardEx covers all FTSE-250 companies 
and 227 out of 332 FTSE-Small Cap companies. We follow common practice in the 
corporate governance literature and exclude financial firms. This gives us a final sample 
of 363 firms with an aggregate market value of £204 billion at the end of December 
2005. 
From BoardEx we collected data on the employment history for all CEOs in the 
sample, as well as data on CEO tenure, CEO/Chairman duality, and the size and 
independence of the board of directors. We sourced accounting data from Thomson 
Financial Datastream, collecting data on accounting performance, leverage, size, and 
growth opportunities. We measure accounting, and not market returns since they are less 
noisy and capture more directly the impact of CEO effort – although we acknowledge 
that they might be subject to managerial manipulation (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995). 
We measure firm performance in terms of return on equity (ROE) and return on assets 
(ROA), as in Core et al. (1999). 
Our analysis is based on UK data, which in terms of board standards are very 
comparable to the US. Both countries have a unitary board, and both countries require the 
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nomination committee to comprise of outside directors only. The countries differ in that it 
is common in the US to have a joint Chairman and Chief Executive, whereas in the UK 
these two positions are commonly split. The results of this UK based research are 
therefore almost perfectly transferable to the US.  
 
Variables 
The CEO networking variable constitutes a cumulative variable measuring the 
total number of dyads with which this person has shared the board either of a public 
company or of other (e.g. non-profit) organizations. It calculates direct ties created 
through all CEO appointments, i.e. both executive and non-executive, but not indirect 
ties, i.e. ties that might have developed through a third director serving on both boards.2 
Our more holistic measure of social network encompasses not just the dyad interlock but 
a more realistic measure of a person’s connections amassed over the lifetime. It is 
empirically calculated, based on individual CEO and not firm level data3, and is not 
dependent upon theoretically estimated benchmarks like random or bipartite graphs as 
commonly used in the existing literature (Robins and Alexander, 2004). As previously 
pointed out, our variable allows a much more precise estimation of a person’s social 
network. 
Given that our main variable on social networks is cumulative restricts our 
investigation to a one-year cross-sectional analysis. However, this will only marginally 
affect our results, as the year-to-year changes of social networks are small; therefore 
using panel data would be of limited value only as there is no significant time series 
variation in the dependent variable. Our measure of CEO social networks is a significant 
improvement to comparative measures previously used in the literature, i.e. interlocking 
and busy boards, as it depicts more accurately the cross-sectional variation of the 
personal networks of each CEO in our sample. In particular, it incorporates the weak 
                                                 
2 The measure of indirect networks has previously been included into empirical studies. In such case, two 
directors A and B from different boards are considered connected just because another director C sits on the 
boards of both A and B. Whether A and B actually know each other, which will allow them to exchange 
information, know-how etc, is not examined by such measures. 
3 Firm level measures are likely to overemphasise the networking effect since they calculate (and treat 
equally) ties of any member of the board, executive and non-executive, to the boards of other companies. In 
Barnea and Guedj (2006) the binary “links” variable takes the value of one for any tie of any member of the 
board to other firms. 
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links, which are – as we have discussed above – of particular importance for the 
transformation and collection of diverse information, and are essential to the innovation 
process. 
We also use the information on CEOs previous employment to construct an 
individual industry dependence variable that allows us to investigate the nature of 
networks. This variable is a binary one, getting the value of one (zero) if the previous 
employment of the CEO was in a firm in the same (different) industry. By previous 
employment, we mean any type of executive, managerial, and rank and file employment 
apart from outside director positions. We exclude the outside director type of 
employment as this does not necessarily require, or indeed provide, industry specific 
knowledge or expertise. We predict a negative relation between networking and career 
path; a CEO that has spent most of her time within an industry will have less chances of 
creating a large network (number of direct ties).  
CEO tenure is measured as the number of years the CEO has retained this 
position. Finally, CEO/Chairman duality is strongly encouraged in the Combined Code; 
we measure it using a binary variable that is one whenever the different roles are 
separated, zero otherwise. 
Regarding financial indicators, we measure firm size by Total Assets (TA)4 and 
leverage as the ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity. We expect networking to be positively 
related to firm size. As larger firms attract better managerial talent, we assume that this 
would lead to a better supply of high-quality outside directorships (Fich, 2005). 
As an indicator of growth opportunities we use the ratio of Market to Book Value 
(MtB), and measure realized growth opportunities in terms of sales growth. We also 
collect data on ownership blocks, and report both the number of major shareholders with 
an ownership block above 3%, and their aggregate ownership stake. 
                                                 
4 As robustness check we have also used market capitalisation as a firm size proxy. All regression results 
are qualitatively the same and the networking-performance relationship even more statistically significant 
(untabulated results). 
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 Analysis 
We rely on one and two-stage regressions to establish the relationship between a 
CEO’s social network and firm characteristics, building on the descriptive statistics to 
examine the extent and structure of CEO networks in the UK market. Looking at the 
descriptive statistics, we are especially interested in identifying industry and size effects 
to give us more insights and understanding how these networks are developed.  
In order to test our determinants of CEO selection, we run linear OLS regressions; 
the dependent variable is our measure of CEO networking. The independent ones consist 
of corporate governance quality indicators and, measures for firm leverage and growth 
opportunities (MtB), and a number of other firm specific controls. We argue that firms 
with certain characteristics look for CEOs with particular distinct features, and not the 
other way around. Therefore, the two models used are as follows: 
 
NW= α1 +β1 CG + γ1 CC + ε      (1) 
and NW= α2 +β2 CP + γ2 CG + δ2 CC + ε    (2), 
 
where NW (Network) is our measure of CEO networking; CG is a vector of 
corporate governance variables including CEO tenure, size of the board of directors, 
independence of the board and CEO/Chairman duality; CC is a vector of firm specific 
variables including leverage and growth opportunities as well as FTSE index 
membership, and firm size. The variable CP that appears independently in the second 
model is our indicator of career paths, i.e. previous employment within the industry. 
To test for the impact of CEO connectedness on firm performance, we utilize two 
different methodologies, measures of performance as well as different performance time 
scales. In the first step, we analyze the impact of a CEO’s social network on sales growth, 
relying on a simple OLS regression of the type: 
 
S = α 3 + β 3 NW + γ 3 CG + δ 3 CC + ε    (3), 
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where S is the dependent variable and takes 3 different forms. In model 1, we use 
the unadjusted net sales growth for the year. The dependent variable in model 2 is the 
industry adjusted net sales growth for the year, whereas in model 3 is a binary one, taking 
the value of one (zero) for above (below) industry average growth in net sales. 
In a second step, we analyse the impact of networking on accounting 
performance. We initiate our analysis by using linear OLS regressions; the initial model 
is: 
 
Π  = α4 +β4 NW + γ4 CG + δ4 CC + ε    (4), 
 
where  is the contemporaneous performance measured by the return on equity 
(ROE) and return on assets (ROA). Everything else is defined as in model 1. However, 
model 4 is conceptually weak for two reasons. First, because of the described 
endogeneity issue between networking and corporate governance.
Π
5 This consequently 
means that our NW variable is conditioned on the CG vector; therefore treating these 
variables as independent contradicts models 1 and 2. Second, there is an endogeneity 
issue between firm performance and networking that cannot be resolved in the context of 
model 4. In particular, by using model 4, we only assume the real direction of causality 
between our measure of networking and the accounting performance variables we utilize. 
Even though we predict that networking drives performance, there is also the argument 
that performance can change networking. Fich (2005) observes that CEOs are more likely 
to obtain outside directorships when the companies they manage perform well. We 
follow Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and also test this ‘inverse’ relationship as a robustness 
check. 
                                                 
5 The issue of non-independence between the networking and CG variables also affects model 3. Therefore, 
as a robustness check, we have also run a 2SLS regression for the Sales Growth model to account for this. 
The results remain qualitatively the same (untabulated results). Note that this 2SLS regression is not as the 
one described in equations 5.1 and 5.2 since it is not clear whether the “direction of causality” problem also 
applies here.  
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We present two methodological solutions to deal with these problems. The first is 
theoretically robust and deals with both issues mentioned above. We create a system of 
equations and run a two stage least square regression, of the following arrangement: 
 
εδγβ +++Π+= CCCGaNW 5555     (5.1) 
εγβ +++=Π CCWNa 666 ˆ      (5.2) 
 
Model 5.1 is the equivalent of model 1 but with performance as an added 
independent variable to control for the inverse relationship. In model 5.2 we use the fitted 
values of NW to test the relation between networking and performance. 
An alternative way to deal with the endogeneity problem is to use long term, 
instead of contemporaneous, performance. In this case we use a five-year performance 
average6, which coincides with the average CEO tenure in our sample. Therefore, the 
model becomes: 
 
Π _5y = α7 +β7 NW + γ7 CG + δ7 CC + ε     (6) 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The 363 firms in our sample are operating in 27 different industries. Most 
prominent is the Service sector that accounts for more than 25% of all firms in our 
sample, followed by Retailing (just above 9%), Construction (7.7%) and Media (7.2%). 
For the full list of the sector distribution, please see appendix 1.  
In respect to CEO connectedness, the average CEO in our sample established 
76.98 (median: 35) boardroom links over her corporate lifetime, ranging from 90 (47.5) 
                                                 
6 Our measure of networking is a cumulative one, calculating the direct ties developed by the CEO over her 
corporate lifetime. Therefore, 5 years of connections will only have a marginal effect on the overall 
number. Using a 5 years performance horizon establishes a more balanced measure of performance, and is 
in line with the average CEO tenure in our sample. As a result, we believe that the benefits of using non-
matching time horizons outweigh possible drawbacks. 
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ties for the average CEO of a FTSE-250 company to 64 (21) for the equivalent of a FTSE 
Small Cap company. These results reflect the fact that larger firms have bigger boards, 
but also that larger firms can attract and afford better managerial talent (see the analysis 
in the previous section). 
As far as career paths are concerned, 78% of the CEOs were previously employed 
within the same industry, but 22% changed the sector. The career path variable is not 
significantly different for FTSE-250 and FTSE Small Cap companies, which indicates 
that any variation in this variable is driven by industry and not size effect. CEOs of 
smaller firms have significantly longer tenure (5.61 years) when compared with the 
tenure of the CEO of FTSE-250 firms (4.61 years). This is consistent with the idea of 
higher mobility between more talented human capital. It is incompatible though with the 
idea of higher retention rates in bigger firms, where the value of the marginal managerial 
product is greater (Baker and Hall, 2004). As far as our other measures of corporate 
governance quality indicators (board independence and CEO duality) are concerned, the 
larger FTSE-250 firms perform significantly better than do the smaller companies in our 
sample. In addition, the FTSE-250 firms do not significantly differ in respect to leverage 
and market-to-book ratio, but outperform the smaller companies when measured by both 
ROE and ROA (even though the differences are less pronounced when adjusting for 
outliers in our sample). This is not the case though in terms of sales growth, where the 
differences between the two sub-samples appear to be statistically insignificant. We 
finally note that there are significant differences between mean and median values for the 
non-binary variables presented in Table 2. To compensate for this, we transform – in line 
with Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) – these variables by ranking the results along the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF).7  
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
We observe substantial industry variation in respect to CEO social networking. 
The picture depicted in appendix 2 is consistent with the argument that sectors that are 
                                                 
7 The CDF is obtained by ranking the observations in ascending order, based on the value of the variable, 
from 1 to the sample size, subtracting 1, and dividing by the sample size minus 1. 
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more specialized have less connected CEOs, as CEOs spent their career within narrow 
sectors and have fewer opportunities to build up a social network (as we will see below). 
Indeed, we some exceptions in Aerospace & IT Hardware, we observe below median 
values for industries such as Chemicals, Electronic & Electrical Equipment, Health, Oil 
& Gas and Pharmaceuticals, while Automobiles & Parts, Leisure & Hotels, 
Telecommunication Services and Transport employ CEOs with above median social 
networks. We also observe considerable industry variation among the career paths of 
CEOs. We find a significant negative correlation between career path and social network 
of the CEO, which means that – as we would expect – CEOs that work within one 
industry only are considerably less connected than those that also take jobs outside their 
industry. However, it is interesting to see that highly specialized sectors like Chemicals, 
Oil & Gas and Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology draw CEOs with highly diverse and 
industry unspecific career paths, while Automobiles & Parts, Construction, Engineering 
& Machinery and Transport hire CEOs from within. The IT Hardware sector has an 
above average career paths; this is consistent with the idea that in specialized sectors 
CEO recruiting is done from within the industry (see appendix 3). 
Table 2 below depicts the correlation matrix amongst the various variables we 
employ in this study. Thereby, board size is positively related to firm size (≈ 40%, 
depending on the firm size measure), as the various measures of size and performance are 
correlated with each other, and – as reported above – career path and social network are 
negatively and significantly correlated. 
 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
Determinants of Networking 
In support of hypothesis 1, we observe that boards of high growth companies, 
measured by a high MTB ratio, are actively searching for well-connected CEOs when 
making their hiring decision. Boards value the better information exchange, and so better 
innovation abilities, of well-connected managers, and actively selecting them as CEOs. 
This argument finds support by Fich (2005), who argues that firms with growth 
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opportunities want to attract managerial talent with a lot of exposure to the outside world, 
which in turn is positively correlated with networking.  
Following the theoretical argument that forms the basis of hypothesis 2, we 
establish a negative relation between financial leverage and a CEO’s social network. 
High gearing of the firm leads to higher risk of bankruptcy, which in turn focuses the 
minds of managers on restructuring the firm and improving its financial position. Boards 
of these firms select a CEO with a small social network. The benefit of hiring a focused 
manager with few other commitments appears to be more important than the ability to 
innovate.  
On a side note, we observe that the size of a CEO’s social network is not 
randomly determined, as is suggested in parts of the social networks literature, but is 
dependent on a career progression factor. Table 3 below depicts the corresponding 
results. The first model represents the base model, with the second one controlling 
additionally for a CEO career path.  
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
In addition, we observe no relation between CEO tenure and CEO’s social 
network. This is in contrast to Nguyen-Dang (2005) that documented a positive relation 
for France, and leads us to believe (although not conclusively, as we have no information 
about the quality of the social circle) that CEOs in the UK do not receive protection 
against dismissal from their social network. 
As expected, we find a positive relationship between CEO networking and board 
size. We were puzzled though to find, after controlling for firm size, a positive relation 
between a CEO’s social network and board independence measured in terms of the ratio 
of outside directors. This result is in line with the agency theory based managerial power 
approach put forward by Bebchuk et al. (2002). This theory argues that outside directors 
are not truly independent of the CEO since they are employed and remunerated by her. 
Following this (arguably cynical) line of argument, this would imply the perception that 
well-connected CEOs use their ties to bring a higher ratio of ‘independent’ directors, and 
use their control to deceive the public by giving the impression of a high-value board. 
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This explanation implicitly also casts doubts on the effectiveness of the definition of 
independence.8 Finally, we observe a statistically insignificant relation between 
networking and the ownership variables. It appears that the existence of blockholders, i.e. 
shareholders with a significant stake in the company, in the ownership structure of the 
firm does not affect the size of the CEO network. 
 
CEO Networks and Firm Performance 
In this paper, we base our analysis of firm performance on both sales growth and 
accounting performance. When analysing sales growth, and basing our analysis on three 
different measures of sales growth, we find no significant relationship between sales 
growth and a CEO’s social network. Therefore, we have to reject Hypothesis 3. This is an 
important finding, as it raises considerable doubt whether well-connected CEOs can 
either add to the innovation process within the firm, or open, to a significant degree, 
doors and help in the sales process. In any case, a CEO’s social network does not seem to 
have a beneficial impact on the firm’s sales performance, which challenges the very 
assumption under which boards hire well-connected CEOs. Surprisingly though, we 
could establish a negative, and for two out of the three measures significant, relationship 
between board independence and sales growth. At this point, we can only speculate about 
possible reasons for this result. One possible explanation is that outside directors prevent 
managers from pursuing additional but unprofitable projects. 
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
                                                 
8 According to the Higgs (2003) report: “A non-executive director is considered independent when the 
board determines that the director is independent in character and judgement and there are no relationships 
or circumstances which could affect, or appear to affect, the director’s judgement.” (p. 37)  
The relationships are defined as: former employee; having material business relationship with the company; 
has received or receives additional remuneration from the company; has close family ties with any of the 
company’s advisers, directors or senior employees; holds cross-directorships or has significant links with 
other directors through involvement in other companies or bodies; represents a significant shareholder; has 
served on the board for more than ten years. 
Even though cross-directorships are mentioned the focus is on current ties. There is no provision to exclude 
outsiders who held cross-directorships in previous years. So even though such provisions appear in other 
relationships, i.e. a former employee must wait for 5 years after the contract was terminated to be 
considered independent, they are ignored for cross-directorships. 
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When analysing the influence of a CEO’s social network on firm accounting 
performance, we establish a significant negative relationship. The results are depicted in 
Table 5 below. Models 1 and 2 are, because of the endogeneity issues discussed above, 
reported for completeness only. Models 3-6 solve these issues. For both our measures of 
performance, ROE and ROA, and after using two different methodologies, 2SLS and a 
long-term measure of performance, we establish this negative impact of a CEO’s social 
network on accounting performance. In conclusion, we find robust evidence in support of 
hypothesis 4. In other words, we find that well-connected CEOs do not use their ties to 
improve firm performance, i.e. in the interest of their shareholders. On the contrary, the 
effort they put into building their networks seems to harm the accounting performance of 
their firms. This result is supportive of the managerial power approach advanced by 
Bebchuk et al. (2002). Again, it challenges the very assumption under which firms hire 
well connected CEOs. To be certain that these results hold for both the high-growth, and 
more mature low-growth firms (as only high-growth firms have a particular preference 
for well-connected CEOs), we stratified our sample and in a second step analyzed high-
growth firms in isolation. We were able to establish a negative, and for our long-term 
performance measure highly significant, impact of a CEO’s social network on the 
performance of the company (untabulated results). This clearly shows that agency costs 
outweigh the benefits of a CEO’s social network, and that even for this sub-group of 
high-growth companies’ boards overestimate the benefits of social networks. 
In line with our results on sales growth, we establish a significant negative impact 
of board independence on accounting performance. One possible explanation is that 
board independence leads to higher risk aversion of the firm, and indicates that the 
legislative push for higher board independence has unintended negative consequences for 
the firm. Another explanation is that independent outside directors are ineffective 
monitors. 
 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
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6. Conclusions and Discussions 
 
This paper aims to establish whether in the market for CEOs it is ‘more important 
who you know than what you know’, and – in case such biased selection process exists - 
whether this is to the benefit or detriment of shareholders. In addition, we want to 
understand whether access to social networks is an important trait boards look for when 
choosing a new CEO. Unfortunately, the theoretical models do provide little guidance in 
this respect. While particular sociologists and organizational behaviour scholars regularly 
point towards the positive dimensions of social networks, economists and other scholars 
closely related to the field follow a more cynical view and argue that CEOs use their 
social network to extract private rents from the firm they manage to the detriment of 
shareholders.  
In summary, our results appear to be at first sight contradictory as we find 
evidence in support of both theories. On the one hand, and in support of the agency 
theorists, we were able to establish that a CEOs large social network has a negative 
impact on accounting performance. Our results are both robust to different specifications 
and highly statistically significant, and are based on a innovative new measure of CEO 
ties, which takes into account the cumulative number of direct ties developed by a CEO 
during her corporate lifetime. The CEO seems to be able to extract private benefits to the 
detriment of shareholders, which is in support of Bebchuck’s et al. (2002) managerial 
power approach. The CEOs appear to use the power and security they gain from having 
access to a large social network for their own benefit rather than the benefit of the firm.  
In addition, we find further evidence in support of the agency theorists, as firms 
with higher leverage appoint CEOs with a significantly smaller social network. In 
particular, the corporate finance literature established that debt acts as a credible 
disciplining devise for managers, as it increases the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcies are costly for managers, as they have a considerable negative impact on 
their human capital (Tirole, 2006). For our case, this implies that boards expect less 
connected CEOs to be more focused and diligent, and also expect them to be better able 
to provide superior leadership to the firm in times of stress. In the trade-off between the 
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benefits of hiring a CEO with access to social networks or the benefits of a focused 
manager, pressured boards clearly value focus over access to social networks. 
In contrast to our results on the impact on performance, we find that growth 
companies with high market-to-book ratios actively choose CEOs with access to a large 
social network. This result supports the sociologists, who point out the beneficial 
dimension of social networks for innovative high-growth companies. It seems that 
nomination committees believe that the benefits of having a well-connected CEO at the 
helm outweigh the associated agency costs. However, we were able to establish that even 
for high-growth companies, the CEO’s access to social network has a negative impact on 
firm performance. In contrast, we do not find any evidence that a well-connected CEO 
would be able to increase the sales of the company. The above evidence leads us to 
believe that nomination committees seem to underestimate the agency costs of social 
networks, and in addition possibly overestimate the benefits of access to a social network 
in generating new growth possibilities.  
The results on performance and leverage have important implications. Focusing 
for another minute on the issue of leverage, one possible explanation is that companies 
that are under pressure from the high debt burden are more likely to focus on exploitation 
of existing processes rather than exploration of new products and processes. This implies 
that exploration is only a viable strategy for firms that are not under stress, and so have 
the freedom of not being dependent on the payout of innovative projects. Rationally 
acting boards choose their CEOs accordingly. They select well-connected CEOs for 
innovative high-growth companies and less-connected ones otherwise. However, the 
significant negative impact of social networks on firm performance indicates that boards 
systematically overestimate the value of social networks when hiring a new CEO, or that 
the expected benefits never materialize as boards fail to monitor highly connected CEO 
adequately. Unlike research based on US and France data, we do not find any evidence 
that CEOs receive protection against dismissal from their social network. At this point, 
we can only speculate about how connected CEOs destroy value. It is not unreasonable to 
assume, though, that the costs of maintaining these social networks outweigh the benefits 
for the firm, with most of the benefits being accrued privately by the CEO (e.g. through 
higher social status). In conclusion, our results indicate that in the Karl Popper’s tradition 
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of competition of theories, agency theory seems to be best suited to fit the data. They are 
winning the argument over the social network theorists. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of our sampled variables. These are presented for the whole sample as well as 
separately for FTSE-250 and FTSE Small Cap constituent companies. The last column provides information on the statistical 
significance of the mean differences between the two sub-samples. Networking is a cumulative variable calculating the direct ties 
the CEO has developed during her corporate lifetime. Career Path is a binary variable taking the value of one if the CEO’s 
previous employment was within the same industry, zero otherwise. CEO Age shows the age of the CEO in calendar years. 
Tenure is the number of years the CEO has retained her current position. SOB is the size of the board, measuring the number of 
all directors sitting on the board. IOB is the independence of the board measure, which is calculated as the ratio of independent 
directors to board size. Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero 
otherwise. Major Shareholders shows the number of shareholders with stakes in the company above the 3% threshold. Major 
Shareholdings shows the cumulative percentage of equity in the hands of the major shareholders. Market Value is the end of year 
market capitalization. Total Assets is the value of a company’s assets for 2005. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity 
and MtB is the ratio of Market to Book Value. Sales_1_yr_Growth shows the percentage growth in net sales during the year. The 
Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) annual figures are in percentages. Details on their calculation can be found 
in the paper (section 3). Obs. is the number of observations per category. Any variation in the number of observations is due to 
missing data. 
 
 Overall FTSE 250 FTSE Small Cap  
Variables Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Obs Mean Median Mean_Dif. 
Networking 363 76.98 35 180 90.05 47.50 183 64.13 21 25.92** 
Career Path 
(dummy) 363 0.78 1 180 0.80 1 183 0.76 1 0.04 
CEO Age 351 50.85 51 174 51.30 52 177 50.41 50 0.89 
Tenure (in years) 363 5.11 4 180 4.61 3 183 5.61 4 -0.99* 
SOB 363 8.59 8 180 9.20 9 183 7.99 8 1.20*** 
IOB 363 0.54 0.56 180 0.56 0.57 183 0.53 0.50 0.03* 
Duality (dummy) 363 0.92 1 180 0.95 1 183 0.90 1 0.05** 
Major 
Shareholders (#) 345 5.44 5 169 5.07 5 176 5.79 6 -0.72*** 
Major 
Shareholdings 
(cumulative %) 
343 38.50 39.50 169 33.79 31.6 174 43.06 44.90 -9.27*** 
Market Value  
(£ mil) 363 562 332 180 946 715 183 184 148 762*** 
Total Assets  
(£ mil) 361 656 305 178 1142 806 183 188 137 953*** 
Leverage 361 0.81 0.45 178 0.78 0.60 183 0.84 0.18 0.06 
MtB 361 81.42 3.39 178 97.33 2.67 183 65.95 3.63 31.37 
Sales 1 yr Growth 
(%) 357 20.11 8.32 176 14.75 8.04 181 25.34 8.68 -10.59 
ROE (%) 344 18.86 15.15 170 26.30 17.33 174 11.59 12.28 14.71** 
ROA (%) 361 6.17 6.72 178 8.26 6.94 183 4.15 6.40 4.11*** 
 
Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
 
This table presents the correlation coefficients for all the variables used in this study. Networking is a cumulative variable calculating the direct ties the CEO has 
developed during her corporate lifetime. Career Path is a binary variable taking the value of one if the CEO’s previous employment was within the same industry, zero 
otherwise. CEO Age shows the age of the CEO in calendar years. Tenure is the number of years the CEO has retained her current position. SOB is the size of the board, 
measuring the number of all directors sitting on the board. IOB is the independence of the board measure, which is calculated as the ratio of independent directors to board 
size. Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero otherwise. Major Shareholders shows the number of 
shareholders with stakes in the company above the 3% threshold. Major Shareholdings shows the cumulative percentage of equity in the hands of the major shareholders. 
Market Value is the end of year market capitalization. Total Assets is the value of a company’s assets for 2005. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity and 
MtB is the ratio of Market to Book Value. Sales_1_yr_Growth shows the percentage growth in net sales during the year. The Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on 
Assets (ROA) annual figures are in percentages. Details on their calculation can be found in the paper (section 3). ROE_5y and ROA_5y are five year averages for ROE 
and ROA.  
 
 Networking 
Career 
Path 
CEO  
Age Tenure SOB IOB Duality 
Major 
Shareholders 
Major 
Shareholdings 
Networking 1.000         
Career Path -0.220 1.000        
CEO Age -0.069 0.009 1.000       
Tenure  -0.015 0.078 0.210 1.000      
SOB 0.195 0.019 0.110 -0.042 1.000     
IOB 0.103 -0.078 -0.060 -0.075 -0.240 1.000    
Duality  -0.011 0.023 -0.186 -0.202 0.093 0.096 1.000   
Major 
Shareholders -0.033 0.148 0.031 0.100 -0.060 0.044 0.123 1.000  
Major 
Shareholdings -0.076 0.119 0.017 0.048 -0.033 -0.102 -0.059 0.550 1.000 
Market Value 0.213 0.004 0.094 -0.101 0.407 0.102 0.062 -0.225 -0.243 
Total Assets  0.195 -0.039 0.093 -0.118 0.398 0.099 0.088 -0.215 -0.272 
Leverage 0.016 -0.123 -0.004 -0.069 0.026 -0.042 0.067 -0.084 -0.071 
MtB -0.045 -0.083 -0.047 -0.055 -0.060 -0.012 0.038 0.096 0.105 
Sales 1yr 
Growth -0.079 -0.107 -0.032 0.051 0.008 -0.032 -0.203 -0.066 -0.072 
ROE  -0.009 -0.046 0.018 -0.008 -0.112 -0.003 0.006 -0.148 -0.107 
ROA  -0.024 0.048 0.074 0.095 -0.107 -0.092 -0.073 -0.130 -0.092 
ROE_5y -0.090 0.071 0.006 0.050 0.072 -0.050 -0.055 -0.063 -0.109 
ROA_5y -0.186 0.075 0.125 0.121 -0.013 -0.146 -0.099 -0.107 -0.083 
Continued…  
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 Market 
Value 
Total 
Assets Leverage MtB 
Sales 1yr  
Growth ROE ROA ROE_5y ROA_5y 
Networking          
Career Path          
CEO Age          
Tenure           
SOB          
IOB          
Duality           
Major 
Shareholders          
Major 
Shareholdings          
Market Value 1.000         
Total Assets  0.799 1.000        
Leverage 0.092 0.188 1.000       
MtB -0.039 -0.074 0.591 1.000      
Sales 1yr 
Growth -0.027 -0.074 -0.068 -0.093 1.000     
ROE  0.073 -0.037 0.390 0.502 0.121 1.000    
ROA  0.122 -0.023 -0.031 0.057 0.159 0.449 1.000   
ROE_5y 0.169 0.112 0.027 -0.137 -0.008 0.417 0.358 1.000  
ROA_5y 0.114 0.056 0.025 -0.216 0.069 0.402 0.625 0.561 1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 CEO Networking Determinants 
 
This table presents the regression results on the determinants of CEO networking. The dependent 
variable is CEO Networking, which is a cumulative variable calculating the direct ties the CEO has 
developed during her corporate lifetime. Career Path is a binary variable taking the value of one if 
the CEO’s previous employment was within the same industry, zero otherwise. CEO Age shows the 
age of the CEO in calendar years. Tenure is the number of years the CEO has retained her current 
position. SOB is the size of the board, measuring the number of all directors sitting on the board. 
IOB is the independence of the board measure, which is calculated as the ratio of independent 
directors to board size. Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and 
Chairman are split, zero otherwise. Major Shareholders shows the number of shareholders with 
stakes in the company above the 3% threshold. Major Shareholdings shows the cumulative 
percentage of equity in the hands of the major shareholders. FTSE-250 is a binary variable taking 
the value of one (zero) if the CEO works for a FTSE-250 (FTSE Small Cap) company. Total Assets 
is the value of a company’s assets for 2005. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity and 
MtB is the ratio of Market to Book Value. We use the cumulative distribution function (CDF) to 
treat outliers, i.e. Networking, Total Assets, Leverage, MtB. In order to calculate CDF the 
observations for each variable are ranked; the ranks are transformed so that they lie uniformly 
between zero and one. Both models include industry dummies. Asterisks indicate significance at 
10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. We calculate heteroskedastisity robust standard errors.  
Dependent Variable CDF_NW 
 Predicted_sign (1) (2) 
Career Path - - -0.182*** (-5.35) 
CEO Age + -0.002 (-0.81) 
-0.002 
(-0.76) 
Tenure  ? 0.003 (0.99) 
0.004 
(1.28) 
SOB + 0.030*** (3.02) 
0.029*** 
(3.18) 
IOB - 0.246*** (2.57) 
0.217** 
(2.36) 
Duality  - -0.092 (-1.52) 
-0.075 
(-1.33) 
Major Shareholders + 0.001 (0.18) 
0.005 
(0.68) 
Major Shareholdings - -0.001 (-1.00) 
-0.001 
(-1.05) 
FTSE 250 + -0.048 (-1.03) 
-0.023 
(-0.52) 
CDF_Total Assets  + 0.486*** (4.77) 
0.456*** 
(4.61) 
CDF_Leverage - -0.130** (-1.99) 
-0.144** 
(-2.26) 
CDF_MtB ? 0.257*** (4.57) 
0.252*** 
(4.65) 
_cons  0.072 (0.38) 
0.181 
(1.01) 
Industry Dummies  YES YES 
Observations  342 342 
R2 (%)  31.97 38.14 
F  5.18 7.26 
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Table 4 CEO Networking and Sales Growth 
 
This table presents the regression results on the effect of CEO networking on sales growth. The dependent variable in model 1 is 
the unadjusted net sales growth for the year. The dependent variable in model 2 is the industry adjusted net sales growth for the 
year. The dependent variable in model 3 is a binary one, taking the value of one (zero) for above (below) industry average growth 
in net sales. CEO Networking is a cumulative variable calculating the direct ties the CEO has developed during her corporate 
lifetime. CEO Age shows the age of the CEO in calendar years. Tenure is the number of years the CEO has retained her current 
position. SOB is the size of the board, measuring the number of all directors sitting on the board. IOB is the independence of the 
board measure, which is calculated as the ratio of independent directors to board size. Duality is a dummy variable taking the 
value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero otherwise. Major Shareholders shows the number of shareholders 
with stakes in the company above the 3% threshold. Major Shareholdings shows the cumulative percentage of equity in the hands 
of the major shareholders. FTSE-250 is a binary variable taking the value of one (zero) if the CEO works for a FTSE-250 (FTSE 
Small Cap) company. Total Assets is the value of a company’s assets for 2005. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity 
and MtB is the ratio of Market to Book Value. We use the cumulative distribution function (CDF) to treat outliers, i.e. Sales, 
Networking, Total Assets, Leverage, MtB. In order to calculate CDF the observations for each variable are ranked; the ranks are 
transformed so that they lie uniformly between zero and one. Both models include industry dummies. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. We calculate heteroskedastisity robust standard errors. Any variation in the 
number of observations is due to missing data. 
 
Dependent Variable CDF_Sales Growth 
(1 year) 
CDF_Sales Growth  
(1 year - Industry adjusted) 
Sales Growth  
(1 year - dummy) 
CDF_NW -0.061 
(-1.00) 
-0.079 
(-1.23) 
-0.117 
(-1.08) 
CEO Age -0.004* 
(-1.69) 
-0.001 
(-0.32) 
-0.002 
(-0.48) 
Tenure  0.007** 
(2.25) 
0.003 
(0.98) 
0.004 
(0.83) 
SOB 0.007 
(0.78) 
-0.006 
(-0.57) 
-0.007 
(-0.44) 
IOB -0.150 
(-1.44) 
-0.232** 
(-2.24) 
-0.456** 
(-2.41) 
Duality  -0.111 
(-1.55) 
-0.042 
(-0.57) 
-0.024 
(-0.20) 
Major Shareholders 0.005 
(0.69) 
-0.009 
(-1.09) 
-0.016 
(-1.14) 
Major Shareholdings -0.003*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.001 
(-1.24) 
-0.002 
(-1.20) 
FTSE 250 0.143*** 
(3.07) 
0.086* 
(1.72) 
0.123 
(1.42) 
CDF_Total Assets  -0.326*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.109 
(-0.89) 
-0.178 
(-0.85) 
CDF_Leverage 0.024 
(0.38) 
-0.007 
(-0.11) 
-0.097 
(-0.83) 
CDF_MtB -0.026 
(-0.40) 
-0.085 
(-1.30) 
-0.069 
(-0.60) 
_cons 1.005*** 
(5.68) 
0.950*** 
(5.13) 
1.180*** 
(3.75) 
Observations 338 338 342 
R2 (%) 10.96 6.92 6.37 
F 3.98 2.35 1.93 
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Table 5 CEO Networking and Accounting Performance 
 
This table presents the regression results on the impact of CEO networking to firm accounting performance. The dependent variable is 
performance, measured by either ROE or ROA and/or their five year averages. CEO Networking is a cumulative variable calculating 
the direct ties the CEO has developed during her corporate lifetime. CEO Age shows the age of the CEO in calendar years. Tenure is 
the number of years the CEO has retained her current position. SOB is the size of the board, measuring the number of all directors 
sitting on the board. IOB is the independence of the board measure, which is calculated as the ratio of independent directors to board 
size. Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero otherwise. Major 
Shareholders shows the number of shareholders with stakes in the company above the 3% threshold. Major Shareholdings shows the 
cumulative percentage of equity in the hands of the major shareholders. FTSE-250 is a binary variable taking the value of one (zero) if 
the CEO works for a FTSE-250 (FTSE Small Cap) company. Total Assets is the value of a company’s assets for 2005. Leverage is the 
ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity and MtB is the ratio of Market to Book Value. We use the cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
to treat outliers, i.e. ROE, ROA, ROE_5y, ROA_5y, Networking, Total Assets, Leverage, MtB. In order to calculate CDF the 
observations for each variable are ranked; the ranks are transformed so that they lie uniformly between zero and one. 
We apply three different methodologies/specifications. Models 1 and 2 use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test the 
contemporaneous relationship between performance and networking. Models 3 and 4 use two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, 
whereas models 5 and 6 use OLS but now the dependent variable is long term performance. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. We calculate heteroskedastisity robust standard errors. Any variation in the number of observations is 
due to missing data. 
Note: When using the 2SLS method Stata suppresses the R2 when they are negative. At any rate, the R2 has no statistical meaning in 
the context of 2SLS/IV and a negative R2 does not mean that our parameter estimates are weak. 
 
Method OLS_Contemporaneous 2SLS OLS_Long Term Performance 
Dependent Variable CDF_ROE CDF_ROA CDF_ROE CDF_ROA CDF_ROE5y CDF_ROA5y
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CDF_NW -0.036 
(-0.61) 
-0.080 
(-1.33) 
-1.058*** 
(-3.15) 
-1.561*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.153** 
(-2.15) 
-0.192*** 
(-2.79) 
CEO Age 0.003 
(1.21) 
0.003 
(1.07) 
- - -0.002 
(-0.61) 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
Tenure  0.001 
(0.54) 
0.004 
(1.49) 
- - 0.005* 
(1.79) 
0.007*** 
(2.83) 
SOB -0.014* 
(-1.76) 
-0.015* 
(-1.72) 
- - 0.003 
(0.32) 
0.016 
(1.56) 
IOB -0.235** 
(-2.45) 
-0.194** 
(-1.93) 
- - -0.394*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.265** 
(-2.29) 
Duality  -0.014 
(-0.27) 
-0.076 
(-1.35) 
- - -0.097 
(-1.36) 
-0.113 
(-1.59) 
Major Shareholders -0.004 
(-0.53) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
-0.005 
(-0.44) 
-0.001 
(-0.10) 
0.009 
(0.95) 
0.008 
(0.92) 
Major Shareholdings -0.003*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.003*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.004*** 
(-2.67) 
-0.004** 
(-2.23) 
-0.003** 
(-2.12) 
-0.003** 
(-2.40) 
FTSE 250 0.143*** 
(3.10) 
0.198*** 
(3.84) 
0.090 
(1.31) 
0.108 
(1.28) 
0.221*** 
(3.98) 
0.253*** 
(4.93) 
CDF_Total Assets  -0.123 
(-0.95) 
-0.285** 
(-2.01) 
0.443* 
(1.68) 
0.557* 
(1.77) 
-0.189 
(-1.23) 
-0.340** 
(-2.87) 
CDF_Leverage -0.048 
(-0.60) 
-0.146* 
(-1.85) 
-0.199* 
(-1.71) 
-0.375*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.030 
(-0.34) 
-0.035 
(-0.46) 
CDF_MtB 0.345*** 
(4.35) 
0.089 
(1.20) 
0.612*** 
(4.59) 
0.465*** 
(3.00) 
-0.059 
(-0.69) 
-0.222*** 
(-3.23) 
_cons 0.764*** 
(6.19) 
0.855*** 
(5.10) 
0.853*** 
(5.81) 
1.139*** 
(6.13) 
1.027*** 
(5.64) 
1.046*** 
(5.75) 
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Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 329 342 329 342 278 298 
R2 (%) 37.30 31.88   39.98 41.99 
F 7.65 7.27   5.88 5.62 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Number of Firms in Sample per Industry 
 
 
Industry Number of Firms Percentage 
      
Aerospace & Defense 8 2.20% 
Automobiles & Parts 6 1.65% 
Beverages 2 0.55% 
Chemicals 5 1.38% 
Construction & Building Materials 28 7.71% 
Electricity 1 0.28% 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 14 3.86% 
Engineering & Machinery 21 5.79% 
Food & Drug Retailers 2 0.55% 
Food Producers & Processors 9 2.48% 
Forestry & Paper 1 0.28% 
General Retailers 31 8.54% 
Health 11 3.03% 
Household Goods & Textiles 6 1.65% 
Information Technology Hardware 11 3.03% 
Leisure & Hotels 19 5.23% 
Media & Entertainment 26 7.16% 
Mining 3 0.83% 
Oil & Gas 14 3.86% 
Personal Care & Household Products 2 0.55% 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 11 3.03% 
Real Estate 21 5.79% 
Software & Computer Services 28 7.71% 
Support Services 56 15.43% 
Telecommunication Services 7 1.93% 
Transport 19 5.23% 
Utilities - Other 1 0.28% 
    
Total Firms/Percentage 363 100.00% 
 
 37
Appendix 2 
 
 
 
CEO Networking per Industry 
 
This figure depicts the industry variation of CEO networking. We use median values since the CEO 
networking variable is skewed. The horizontal axis shows the number of CEO direct ties. The 
vertical axis crosses the horizontal at the median value of the overall sample (35 ties). The industries 
depicted on the left (right) of the vertical axis have median values below (above) the overall median. 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
Career Path per Industry 
 
This figure depicts the industry variation of CEO Career Paths. We use average values since the 
CEO Career Path variable is a binary one. The horizontal axis shows the average number of CEO 
career paths. The vertical axis crosses the horizontal at the average value of the overall sample 
(0.78). The industries depicted on the left (right) of the vertical axis have average values below 
(above) the overall mean. 
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